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THE EFFECT OF PARAGRAPH 93(1) AKTG
Paragraph 93(1) AktG provides that in carrying on
business, the members of the management board shall
exercise the degree of care of a diligent and conscientious
manager.  They shall not disclose confidential information
or secrets of the company, especially trade and business
secrets, which they have become aware of as the result of
their service on the management board.  Paragraph 93(1)
has been said to impose an objective standard of conduct
on the members of the management board:  they are liable
in damages to the company if they fail to attain the
required standard.  One of the leading textbooks indicates
that this standard must be attained in the exercise of the
specific tasks imposed on the management board by the
relevant provisions of the Aktiengesetz, such as paragraphs
76, 80, 81, 83, 88, 90 and 92 thereof (see Uwe Hüffer,
Aktiengesetz, 9th ed, pub C H Beck, 2010, p 493). 
Confidential information consists of all information
which has been acquired by the directors acting in this
capacity, not necessarily as the result of their own efforts.
Business secrets consist of all facts which are not published
and which, according to the express or presumed
intentions of the company, regard being paid to interests,
should not be made public, provided that there is an
objective need for such secrecy (BGHZ 64, 325). They
indicate such matters as processes of manufacture or
production, particularly of customers, and financial plans
and decisions concerning staff. The duty to preserve
confidentiality is not limited to the time when a director
holds office, and is imposed on all the directors, including
those who are appointed by the court, or who are deputies,
or who represent the employees in accordance with the
Codetermination Acts.
The requirement of confidentiality is inapplicable when
the giving of information is in the interests of the company.
Thus, such information may be given in the context of a
due diligence exercise, or when shares are to be purchased
on a stock exchange.
Liability for breach of duties
Paragraph 93(2) AktG provides that members of the
management board who are in breach of their duties shall
be jointly and severally liable to their company for any
resulting damage.  They shall bear the burden of proof in
the event of a dispute as to whether or not they have
employed the degree of care of a competent and
conscientious manager.  It is not entirely clear whether this
provision is applicable both to their duties under the
relevant provisions of company law and those governed by
their contract of appointment, or whether it applies only to
the first mentioned duties. (See Hüffer, op cit, p 500, who
appears to take the latter view). The relevant paragraph
applies to the deputies of members of the management
board, and to members thereof who are appointed by the
court; it is also applicable to those who are defectively
appointed.
Members of the management board may not be found to
have acted in breach of their duties to the company if they
have merely been guilty of errors of judgment and
mistakes. (An approach similar to that taken in the
American “business judgment” rule has been taken by
German courts in two important recent cases in which it
was recognised that members of the management board
must have a margin of discretion (Handlungspielraum),
without which their tasks would be impossible.  These two
decisions are ARAG/Garmenbeck BGHZ 135, 244, 251 and
Siemens/Nold BGH NJW 1996, 2815, 2816). However, the
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also deal with the prohibition of competition imposed on the members of the management
board (board of directors) by paragraph 88 AktG.
members of the management board are likely to incur
liability to their company if they have acted in an absolutely
unjustifiable manner. Such liability may be imposed on
them if what they have done is clearly not in the interests
of the company, or if they have taken unjustifiable risks
when acting on its behalf.  It will be necessary to show that
there has been a defect in the management of the company,
and that at the time of the relevant decision or transaction
which gave rise to the liability, it was evident that there was
such a defect, or that such evidence was available to the
member of the management board against whom the
action was brought on some other basis.  In one case which
was heard by the Oberlandsgericht of Dusseldorf, the
impugned transaction involved the grant of a loan
amounting to 55 million German marks by the financial
board of a company to another company without taking
security.  The latter company became insolvent and the
members of the financial  board of the lender were
unsurprisingly held liable (see Die AG (Die Aktiengesellschaft)
1997, 231, 234 and Hüffer, op cit at pp 493, 500-1, 504). 
The fact that a member of the management board does
not take part in a transaction does not exclude him or her
from liability.  Such a person cannot maintain that they
have forgotten what has been told them about the
transaction at a meeting of the board. A member of the
management board must take account of the impressions
that they have received of the activities of the other
members of the management board at a meeting thereof.
He or she has a right to object when there is concrete
evidence that the responsible manager is not fulfilling their
duties.  This is apparent from a case (see BGHZ 133, 378
et seq) in which there was evidence that because the
relevant company was in a situation of crisis employees’
contributions to social security were not properly made.
In other cases of a less blatant character, evidence will also
have to be given of the failure of members of the
management board to fulfill their duties.
A member of the management board is not liable to pay
damages when they can show that they have exercised the
necessary degree of care. Such a person does not incur
liability when employees of the company have acted in a
manner which has caused damage to it.  It is necessary to
show that the wrongful act or omission of the member(s)
of the management board has caused the damage to the
company in order for the latter to become liable.  The
damage is required to consist of a diminution in the
company’s assets in a manner which is inconsistent with its
object. The making of social security contributions on
behalf of the employees does not constitute such a
diminution.
As already indicated, paragraph 93(2), sentence 2 AktG
provides that the members of the board bear the burden of
proving that they have employed the degree of care
required of a diligent and conscientious manager. (They are
required to bear the burden of proving that there was no
wrongful act or omission on their part.  The company must
show the existence and amount of the damage, mention
the act or omission of the relevant managers, and show the
causal effect of the act or omission (see Hüffer, op cit, p
477). The action against the members of the management
board is brought by the company’s supervisory board,
provided that the general meeting resolves by a simple
majority in accordance with paragraph 147(1) AktG. In
addition, paragraph 148(2) AktG provides that shareholders
who hold at least 1 per cent of the share capital may
require the court to bring a direct action in the company’s
name against the managers.
It does not always prove readily possible to show that the
breach of duty by a manager has occurred which has
resulted in damage.  The courts have sometimes resorted
to presumptions in order to overcome this difficulty.  Thus
where a significant amount of cash is missing, or goods are
no longer in a warehouse, the courts have sometime
presumed that this is the fault of the managers.  However,
the courts have not been willing to assume that any
diminution in assets is necessarily the fault of the
managers, and have sometimes applied a restrictive
interpretation of paragraph 93(2) sentence 2 AktG in such
cases.
Managers who are jointly and severally liable to the
company for damage caused to it in accordance with
paragraph 93(2) AktG may claim a contribution from those
of their number who can be shown to have a greater degree
of responsibility for the relevant action.  Shareholders who
suffer injury as the result of acts or omissions of the
management board cannot claim that paragraph 93(2) is a
Schutsgesetz (protective statutory provision) intended for
the protection of others, and requires reparation on the
basis thereof.  (Paragraph 823(2) of the Civil Code imposes
an obligation to make reparation upon a person who
infringes a statutory provision intended for the protection
of others). Such protective provisions which may be
invoked by shareholders suffering damage include
paragraph 266 of the Penal Code and paragraph 399 AktG,
which imposes criminal liability for making false
statements.
It appears that third parties such as creditors cannot
make claims against members of the management board of
the company under paragraph 93(2) AktG, or under that
provision coupled with paragraph 823(2) of the Civil
Code. It is apparent that creditors may do under paragraph
92(2) AktG which is concerned with the initiation of
insolvency proceedings, and which has held to be a
provision intended for the protection of others within the
meaning of paragraph 823(2) of the Civil Code. In
addition, members of the management board may incur
delictual liability (tortious liability) towards third parties
who are harmed by their acts or omissions. In a case
decided by the German Supreme Court in 1994 (see
BGHZ 125, 366) the managing director (Geschaftsführer) of
a German private company was held liable in tort for
negligently failing to take precautions, where such 29
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negligence resulted in the infringement of another person’s
property rights.  This decision has encountered substantial
criticism in the relevant literature, because it has been
contended that paragraph 823(2) of the Civil Code applies
to positive action rather than to failures to act.
The special rules contained in paragraph 93(3) Aktg
The above provision stipulates that members of the
management board shall in particular (sind namentlich) be
liable for damages in nine specific circumstances.  Eight of
these circumstances involve the making of payments or
distribution of shares or assets by the company, whilst the
other consists of the issue of share certificates before the
issue price has been fully paid.  In each case the action
must be one which is contrary to the Aktingesetz. (Note in
this sense Hüffer, op cit, p 506 and Die Aktiengesellschaft,
2003, p 321.  However, certain other provisions of the
Aktiengesetz, ie paragraphs 92(2) and 400 thereof, which
concerns representatives of the creditors of the company,
may be regarded as protective statutory provisions for the
benefit of creditors in the sense meant in paragraph 823(2)
of the Civil Code). 
Exclusions of liability under paragraph 93(4) AktG
According to the first sentence of the above provision, a
member of the management board shall not be liable top the
company for damages if they acted in accordance with a
lawful resolution of the shareholders’ meeting.  Such a
resolution must not be void or voidable.  Every resolution of
the general meeting concerning the management of the
company passed without being requested by the
management board is void, according to the provisions of
paragraph 119(2) AktG. The nullity of a resolution which is
void may no longer be asserted if it has been registered in the
Commercial Register and three years have elapsed. (See para
242(2) AktG. In addition, by para 242(1) AktG, the nullity of
a resolution of a shareholders’ meeting which contrary to
para 130(1)(2) and (4) has not been recorded or properly
recorded may no longer be asserted if the resolution has
been entered in the Commercial Register.)  A resolution
which is voidable becomes no longer so within one month
after its adoption, according to paragraph 246(1) AktG. It
appears that once the nullity of a resolution may no longer be
asserted it can no longer be treated as a nullity under
paragraph 93(4).  The same would seem to be true of a
voidable resolution once it may no longer be avoided.
It will be noted that the exclusion of a member of the
management board from liability for damages is contingent
on his or her acting on the basis of a lawful resolution of
the general meeting.  Such a person who acts on the basis
of an unlawful resolution which he or she has himself or
heself procured by giving wrongful information may still be
liable (note in this sense Hüffer, op cit, p 507.)
According to paragraph 93(4) sentence 2 AktG, liability
for damages shall not be excluded by reason of the fact that
the supervisory board has consented to the act.  The waiver
or compromise of a claim for damages by the accompany
against members of the management board is dealt with by
paragraph 93(4) sentence 3 AktG. This text provides that
such a transaction may take place upon the expiry of three
years after the claim has arisen, provided that the
shareholders’ meeting consents thereto, and no minority
share aggregate shareholding equals or exceeds one-tenth
of the share capital records an objection in the minutes of
the meeting.  The meeting reaches its decision by a simple
majority vote (para 133 AktG) and the relevant members of
the management board against whom the claim is made
have no vote.
The final sentence of paragraph 93(4) AktG provides that
the foregoing period (of three years) does not apply if the
person liable for damages is unable to make payments
when they become due and enters into a composition with
his creditors to avoid insolvency proceedings, or if the
liability to pay damages is subject to an insolvency plan.
Paragraph 93(5) AktG and the rights of creditors
Paragraph 93(5) AktG sentence 1 provides that the claim
of the company for damages may also be asserted by the
company’s creditors if they are unable to obtain
satisfaction from the company.  However, the sentence
which follows it stipulates that in cases other than those set
out in paragraph 93(3) of this rule shall apply only if the
members of the management board have grossly violated
the duty of care of a diligent and conscientious manager.  It
also makes it clear that in any litigation by the creditors, the
burden of proving that they have acted as diligent and
conscientious managers will be placed on the relevant
members of the management board.
Creditors are treated as being unable to obtain satisfaction
from the company if it cannot pay its debts:  there is no need
for them to attempt to levy execution against it. It follows
from sentence 3 of paragraph 93(3) AktG that liability for
damages to creditors may not be extinguished as the result of
a waiver or compromise by the company, nor by the fact that
the act which caused the damage was based on a resolution
of the shareholders meeting.
The creditors must require payment to themselves, and
not to the company.  A member of the management board
who has already been sued by the company for damages
cannot raise the objection that such a claim is pending in
litigation by the company’s creditors against him or her.
However, if a member of the management board satisfies
the claim made against him by the company, his liability to
the creditors is extinguished. It is possible for a creditor to
bring an action against the company, and also to enforce it
by execution proceedings directed against the company’s
claim for damages against a member of the management
board, which have the effect of transferring this claim to
the creditor. The use of such proceedings has practical
advantages.30
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The final sentence of paragraph 93(5) AktG deals with the
effect of insolvency proceedings. It provides that if such
proceedings have been instituted in respect of the company’s
assets, the administrator (Sachverwalter) or receiver
(Insolvenzverwalter) shall exercise the rights of the creditors
against the members of the management board during the
course of the proceedings.  The creditors themselves cannot
bring an action against such persons during the course of the
insolvency proceedings. The bringing of insolvency
proceedings will interrupt any such action which is
proceeding. The receiver may bring a claim against a member
of the management board whose liability for damages to
creditors is not extinguished by a waiver or compromise by
the company.  Furthermore, the receiver is not bound by the
rule contained in paragraph 93(3) sentence 3 AktG, and may
enter into compromises with creditors.
Expiration of claims under paragraph 93(5)
sentences 1-5 AktG
The expiration of claims under the above provisions is
dealt with by paragraph 93(5) sentence 6 AktG, which
provides that such claims may no longer be made after the
expiration of a period of five years.  When claims are made
under other legal provisions they are subject to the relevant
limitation period for such provisions. The limitation
period for an action against a member of the management
board begins when the plaintiff company has become
aware or failed to have become aware of the wrongful act
of the relevant member of the management board or has
failed to become so aware by reason of gross negligence on
its part.
COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE PROVISIONS
The provisions of paragraph 93(5) AktG are somewhat
detailed, and bear little resemblance to those contained in
paragraphs 171-77 of the UK Companies Act 2006, which
applies both to public and private companies. There is
nothing in the Aktiengesetz or in the GmbH Gesetz which
regulates private companies corresponding to the
somewhat controversial provisions of section 172 of the
Companies Act 2006, which imposes a duty to promote
the success of the company on its directors, and there is an
imposition of a duty of a pluralistic nature, requiring the
directors to promote interests other than that of the
company such as those of employees, customers or the
environment, in paragraph 93 AktG. The existence of
employee codetermination at the level of the supervisory
board in large German companies having at least 2,000
employees may help to further the employees’ interests.
RULES GOVERNING THE PROHIBITION OF
COMPETITION BY MEMBERS OF THE
MANAGEMENT BOARD
The above rules, which are an important feature of
German company law, are contained in paragraph 88 AktG.
They reflect the fact that the members of the management
board of a German public company have fiduciary duties to
that company.  (See the judgment of the Oberlandesgericht of
Frankfurt to this effect, reported in Die Aktiengesellschaft,
2000, pp 518, 519). The ambit of the rules considered
below is rather wide.  In some other jurisdictions relevant
similar rules may exist or be rendered permissible under
the provisions of competition law.
Rules contained in paragraph 88(1) AktG
The above paragraph stipulates that, unless the
supervisory board so consents, the members of the
management board may neither engage in any trade nor
enter into any transaction in the company’s area of
business on their own behalf, or on that of others.  In the
absence of such consent they may neither be a member of
the management board nor a manager or general partner of
another commercial undertaking (for example a public or
private company, or a commercial partnership). The
consent of the supervisory board may be granted only for
a specific trade or business, a specific commercial
enterprise, or for specific types of transactions.
Paragraph 88(1) AktG is designed to protect the
company against certain activities by its directors, and to
safeguard it from competition by them.  It is appreciable to
members of the management board and their deputies (but
not to the members of the supervisory board) of the
company whilst they remain in office. The prohibition in
pursuing managerial activities in another commercial
undertaking is not limited to undertakings in the same field
of business, and does not apply to membership of the
supervisory boards of such undertakings.
The claim for damages under paragraph 88(2)
AktG
The above text provides that if a member of the
management board fails to comply with the prohibition
contained in paragraph 88(1) AktG the company may claim
damages from them.  It may instead require that such a
member treats the transaction made on his behalf as having
been made on behalf of the company, and give up any
remuneration received from another person, or assign his
rights to it, to the company. The latter alternative
sometimes has the advantage that no depletion in the
company’s assets occurs, but its use requires that the
company could have carried on the activity by itself, and is
not prohibited from doing so. (Hüffer, op cit, p 456). 
The provisions of paragraph 88(3) AktG concerning
limitation
The above provision stipulates that the claims of the
company shall be extinguished within three months after
the other members of the management and the
supervisory board come to know of the act giving rise to
damages.  Irrespective of such knowledge, such claims are
barred upon the expiry of five years after the time when 31
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they have arisen.  It appears that this rule does not apply
where the supervisory board has not given its consent to
the relevant act, or has given it improperly.
Contractual provisions extending the ambit of the
statutory rules
It is possible to extend the statutory rules contained in
paragraph 88 AktG to cover activities of a member of the
management board which occur after their retirement.
However, limits on competitive activities which occur after
such retirement are regulated in paragraph 1 of the Law
against Restraints upon Competition (Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) and in paragraph 138 of the
German Civil Code. Both these provisions require any
prohibition of such activities to be required by the
legitimate interests of the company and its undertaking,
and to be limited in substance, time and extent according
to the needs of the company for protection (see Hüffer, op
cit, p 457 for further details.)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The specific provisions contained in paragraph 88 AktG
concerning competitive activities by the directors would
not seem to be paralleled in many other jurisdictions.
However, the pursuit of such activities will be subject to the
relevant rules governing directors’ fiduciary duties and of
competition law in such jurisdictions. The provisions
contained in paragraph 93 AktG, which have already been
discussed above, appear to be of a more comprehensive
and detailed nature than is the case in most other
jurisdictions.
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